I thought for a moment "is it possible to create a fork-PRB that is only a softfork to pre-fork-PRB but a hardfork for trb?" I think the answer is no, so yes you are right, good point.

> ... the other interesting IMHO aspect is that plenty of folks who currently not paying attention, would likely start if they were to smell payola. E.g. from my and over9000 other people's POV, "BCH" was a glorious phree gift of coin, and was worth paying attention to for precisely as long as it took to split off and liquidate the "gift".

If I understand correctly, this means ~ if trb-nodes mostly go offline, but then one day prb forks, people will be motivated to startup some trb-nodesagain so they can sell on the prb-fork and keep the trb-coin. If so, yes I agree.

The number of people who publicly run trb nodes is quite small. If the nodes were to all go offline, then bitcoin core would be able to tweak their code so that they issue a hard fork with what-would-be trb, and no one would notice.

I agree that the chance that prb pulls off a hardfork while there are people paying attention is low, given the numerous failed attempts already.

not clear to me that them running has much to do with preventing the segshit-hardfork to date, though.

> impossible to convince anyone that this chain has value, including the miners

aha.

> not possible however at the current moment to dump trb coins on a separate segchain, because the segchain and trbchain are the same

my contention is that if suddenly they could no longer be seen as 'the same', the hard-segshit fork would play out similarly to BCH. given as hard-segshit would be effectively the same proggy as the BCH client.

No, i agree the hard forks would continue on and on. Afaik this is the case with Bitcoin Cash, it itself has a subfork BSV. The main aspect of the third outcome I propose is that trb nodes are no longer running, not that there is a hardfork.

> The naive POV, "all forks to date resolved in the direction which'd benefit miners", doesn't quite hold, incidentally: hypothetically, e.g. a "tx fees start at 1btc" fork is possible -- and even "softly", at that; but not won (nor afaik happened at all) to date. nor, e.g. a "gift satoshi's hodl to miners" fork. worth considering why.)

Well I would argue to say that "tx fees start at 1btc" does not work well because the miners believe that chain will be valueless, i.e. the miners will perhaps gain btc, but those btc will be worth less.

> For that matter, worth considering "why was segshit brought in as 'soft' fork to begin with?"

I believe this is precisely because attempts to hard fork failed through economic attack. It is not possible however at the current moment to dump trb coins on a separate segchain, because the segchain and trbchain are the same. So there's no ability to "crash the enemy's market".

> Incidentally, may be worth conducting a game-theoretical experiment: bake a fork-noad where 1btc of satoshi's hodl is "gifted" to the claimant of each mined block after $index, "while supplies last." Per the naive POV, "51%" will jump on it.

I don't think this will have any traction because it will be impossible to convince anyone that this chain has value, including the miners.

The naive POV, "all forks to date resolved in the direction which'd benefit miners", doesn't quite hold, incidentally: hypothetically, e.g. a "tx fees start at 1btc" fork is possible -- and even "softly", at that; but not won (nor afaik happened at all) to date. nor, e.g. a "gift satoshi's hodl to miners" fork. worth considering why.)

For that matter, worth considering "why was segshit brought in as 'soft' fork to begin with?"